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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MAXIMO RAMON RAMOS,
Defendant/Appellant.

: Case No. 930393-CA
Priority No. 2
:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in

which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.

Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the
following grounds:
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship between
the prospective juror and any party, witness, or
person alleged to have been victimized or injured
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling
to return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism.
A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or
employed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof;
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part
of the juror with reference to the cause, or to
either party, which will prevent him from acting
impartially
and
without
prejudice
to
the
substantial rights of the party challenging; but no
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason
of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury,
founded upon public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily
appears to the court that the juror can and will,
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.

2

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice/ confusion/ or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (as amended effective
October 1, 1992) provides in pertinent part:
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs/ or acts. Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to strike

juror Richard E. Scholle for cause due to bias resulting from 20
years of employment with law enforcement agencies?
Standard of review.

"A motion to dismiss a prospective

juror for cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
When reviewing such a ruling, we reverse only if the trial court
has abused its discretion."

State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 442

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

But

trial courts must adequately probe a juror's potential
bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest
a bias.
The court's discretion is properly exercised
3

when deciding whether to dismiss a juror for cause only
after this investigation takes place.
Id.

Because the trial court

failed to probe

adequately,

his

determination is entitled to no deference and is reviewed de novo.

2.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting a mug

shot of defendant into evidence over defendant's objection that it
was improper evidence of prior bad acts and unduly prejudicial?
Standard of review.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence under rule 403, we will not
overturn the court's determination unless it was an
"abuse of discretion."
To state the matter more
precisely, we review the trial court's 403 ruling
admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision
that "the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness" was
beyond the limits of reasonability. Of course, like any
other evidentiary ruling, an erroneous decision to admit
or exclude evidence based on rule 4 03 cannot result in
reversible error unless the error is harmful.25
25

Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239 (brackets in original)
(citations omitted); accord Verde, 770 P.2d at 120.
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d

1232, 1241 and n.25

(Utah 1993).

Admission of evidence of prior crimes "is presumed prejudicial and,
absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to
show criminal disposition, the evidence is Excluded."

State v.

Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

3.

Whether the trial court erred in precluding cross-

examination of Detective Lucas concerning the lengths he is willing

4

to

go

to

obtain

convictions,

including

use

of

confidential

informants?
Standard

of

Review.

Whether

evidence

is

properly

admissible is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.

State

v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Maximo Ramon Ramos was charged by information dated May
1,

1992

with

distribution,

offering

agreeing,

consenting

of

arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
jury trial was held March 16-17, 1993.

(Supp. 1993).

See transcripts, R. 248-

496, 497-604. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Ramos

was

sentenced

to a term

of

A

1-15

R. 219. Mr.

years, stayed

pending

satisfactory completion of probation, including six months in jail,
$500 fine plus surcharge, $500 restitution, and $300 recoupment to
LDA.

R. 223-4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The information alleged that Mr. Ramos was involved in a
sale of cocaine to undercover detective Ed Lucas on January 31,
1992.
P.M.

R. 7-8.
R. 10.

Mr. Ramos was arrested on October 17, 1992 at 9:30
Trial was held March 16-7, 1993.

Potential juror

Scholle indicated that he had been employed by law enforcement
agencies for some twenty years as a dispatcher, including "about a
year with Salt Lake County Police as a dispatcher."
5

R. 316-7.

After

ascertaining

that

Mr.

Scholle

was

never

involved

in

investigation or court room testimony, the court asked Mr. Scholle
a single follow-up question:
THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr.
Scholle, that you described would prevent you from being
fair and impartial if you were a juror in today's case?
MR. SCHOLLE:
R. 317.

It would affect my opinion.

Although the trial court had previously asked the usual

question of whether the potential juror would be more inclined to
believe the testimony of a police officer, R. 309-310, the court
failed to ask Mr. Scholle this question individually, or further
probe his attitudes and feelings towards law enforcement officers.
Defense counsel's challenge for cause, R. 347-8, was denied by the
court without additional questioning of the potential juror.
348.

The defense used

its first peremptory

challenge

Scholle, and used all four peremptory challenges.

R.

on Mr.

R. 153.

Detective Lucas made an in-court identification of Mr.
Ramos.

R. 3 77.

On cross-examination, defense counsel ascertained

that Detective Lucas did not use any lineup procedures to identify
Mr. Ramos:
Q [by Ms. Remal]
You haven't participated in
viewing people in a line up to try and identify which
person was involved with Mr. Garcia and the transaction
in this case, have you?
A [Det. Lucas]
It wasn't necessary.
Q
Have you viewed a photo spread, a series of
photographs, to see if you could identify that person?
A
It took only one to identify it.
Q
And what photograph was that?
A
I am afraid that if I mention that it may
prejudice the jury.
R. 439-40.

On re-direct, Detective Lucas again testified that he

confirmed his identification of Mr. Ramos by reviewing a photograph
6

of Mr. Ramos.

R. 442-4.

This photograph, a "mug shot" of Mr.

Ramos, was offered as State's Exhibit 3.

After an off the record

discussion, the prosecutor continued re-direct without a ruling
from the court.

R. 444.

The mug shot was again offered and the

trial court expressly reserved ruling until argument could be had
outside the presence of the jury.

R. 446.

After the jury was

dismissed for the day, R. 485, the court heard argument concerning
whether Exhibit 3 should be received.

R. 486-490. The trial court

allowed the mug shot to come into evidence, but required that the
booking information and date be excised.

R. 490.

The frontal and

profile views were not separated or otherwise disguised.

A copy of

the mug shot as admitted is contained in Addendum A.
Defense

counsel

attempted

to cross-examine

Detective

Lucas with respect to his use of confidential informants in other
cases, and the benefits they receive.

The State objected, and the

court sustained the objection after an off the record discussion.
R. 415.
counsel

At the conclusion of the first day of trial, defense
put

her objection

on the record,

indicating

that

the

proposed line of questioning went to the detective's motive and
bias, and bore directly on his credibility.

R. 491-2.

The trial

court indicated that "that line of questioning was too far removed
from the facts of this particular case for it to be relevant, and
that was the basis of the Court's ruling."

7

R. 4 92-3.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prospective juror Scholle indicated that he had been
employed

for

dispatcher.

twenty

years

by

law

enforcement

agencies l as

a

The trial court failed to adequately probe how this

experience might affect his ability to give proper credibility to
witnesses, apply the presumption of innocence, and be fair and
impartial to both parties.

The trial court should have probed

further, or stricken Mr. Scholle for cause.

Because Mr. Ramos was

forced to utilize a peremptory strike on this juror, Mr. Ramos is
entitled to a new trial.
Over objection, the trial court admitted a mug shot of
Mr. Ramos into evidence.

The investigating detective had already

made a positive in-court identification, and defendant did not
challenge the detective's ability to identify Mr. Ramos.

This mug

shot should have been excluded as evidence of prior bad acts.

The

mug shot was not needed by the prosecution, was obviously a mug
shot taken by a law enforcement agency, was taken at some time
prior to the instant offense, and its alteration between the time
that the detective viewed it before the jury and the time it was
submitted to the jury with one quarter of the photo cut away only
served to emphasize the prejudicial nature of the photo. The photo
was improperly admitted, and prejudiced the jury against Mr. Ramos.
Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial at which the mug shot is
suppressed.
Defense counsel sought to cross-examine the investigating
detective as to the measures he takes in other cases to obtain
8

convictions, as such measures relate to his bias and motive to
testify.

The trial court ruled that such measures were irrelevant.

Evidence of bias and motive is always relevant.
examination

on

these

matters

violated

Mr.

Limiting crossRamos'

right

to

confrontation under the sixth amendment and article I, section 12
of the Utah Constitution.

Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial

where his right to cross-examine witnesses is not unduly curtailed.
Even

if

individually

some

of

these

errors

are

not

reversible, the cumulative effect of these errors requires that Mr.
Ramos be given a new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
STRIKE A POTENTIAL JUROR FOR CAUSE.

The trial court erroneously denied defense
challenge for cause to potential juror Scholle.

TO

counsel's

R. 348.

Rule

18(e) (14), Utah R. Crim. P., provides that a challenge for cause
may be made on the grounds
that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice
to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or
cause to be submitted to such jury . . .
if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can
and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Rule 18(e)(4) provides that a challenge for cause may be made on
the grounds of
the existence of any . . . business . . . or other
relationship between the prospective juror and any party
9

[or]
witness,
. . . which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return
a verdict which would be free of favoritism.
Juror Scholle indicated that he was employed for twenty
years as a police dispatcher, including "about a year with Salt
Lake County Police as a dispatcher."
briefly

explored

and

ascertained

R. 316-7.

that

Mr.

The trial court

Scholle

was

never

involved in the investigation phase of any criminal activity, and
had never testified in court on any police matter.

The court then

asked Mr. Scholle only one follow-up question:
THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr.
Scholle, that you described would prevent you from being
fair and impartial if you were a juror in today's case?
MR. SCHOLLE:
R. 317.

It would affect my opinion.

Although the trial court had previously asked the usual

question of whether any potential juror would be more inclined to
believe the testimony of a police officer,1 R. 309-310, the court
failed to ask Mr. Scholle this question individually, or further
probe his attitudes and feelings towards law enforcement officers.
The question that was asked, and the answer given, do
nothing to dispel the inference of bias raised by Mr. Scholle's
employment in law enforcement agencies.

The transcript indicates

that Mr. Scholle would be affected as a result of his employment
i g e e , e.g.. State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767-8 (Utah 1980)
("Are there any of you who would be inclined to give the testimony
of a Peace Officer greater weight . . . ") ; State v. Gray, 851 P. 2d
1217, 1223 (Utah App. 1993) ("is there anything in that experience
. . . that would make you want to give more or less weight to the
testimony of police officers"); State v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 860,
865 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App.
1992) ("do you think that fact would make you want to give more or
less weight to the testimony of a police officer").
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history in law enforcement.

Even if he had indicated an ability to

be fair and impartial, such responses carry little weight.

"A

statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial
loses much of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts
which suggest a bias."

Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P. 2d 533, 536 (Utah

1981) (citing Lambert v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 560 P.2d
262 (Or. 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see
that the constitutional rights of an accused to an
impartial jury is safeguarded," State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d
318, 319-20 (Utah 1977), and has reversed criminal
convictions based solely on the appearance that such
right may have been jeopardized.
Accordingly, trial
courts must adequately probe a juror's potential bias
when that juror's responses or other facts suggest a
bias. The court's discretion is properly exercised when
deciding whether to dismiss a juror for cause only after
this investigation takes place.
State v. Woollev,
original,

810 P. 2d 440, 442

footnote omitted),

(Utah App.)

cert, denied,

(emphasis in

826 P.2d

651

(Utah

1991) ; accord State v. Bovatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) .
The level of investigation necessary once voir
dire reveals potential juror bias will vary from case to
case and is necessarily dependant on the juror's
responses to the questions asked.
Nevertheless, the
exploration should not merely be pro forma.
When an inference of bias is raised, the
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a
subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she
can be fair and impartial.
As the supreme court has
stated, " [a] statement made by a juror that she intends
to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning in
light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias."
State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 [(Utah 1984)] (quoting
Jenkins fv. Parrish] , 627 P.2d
[533] at 536 [(Utah
1981)]) .
Woolley, 810 P. 2d at 445. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the accused.

Hawkins v. State, 717 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Okla. Crim.
11

App. 1986).

" [T] he exercise of the trial court's discretion in

selecting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed 'in light of the
fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias
simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another.'"
Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (quoting Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,
536 (Utah 1981).
Rebuttal of an inference of bias is "accomplished by a
showing that the statement was merely the product of a ' light
impression' and not one that would 'close the mind against the
testimony that may be offered in opposition.'"

State v. Bishop,

753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d
765, 768 (Utah 1980)); accord State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1127
(Utah 1989), State v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah App. 1992).
The rehabilitative efforts of the trial judge in this
case were inadequate, and at most pro forma. A comparison with the
rehabilitation conducted in State v. Bovatt, No. 920577-CA (Utah
App. May 7, 1993) (nine questions used to rehabilitate), Cobb, 774
P.2d

at

Gotschall,

1126-8
782

(eleven
P. 2d

459

rehabilitative
(Utah

1989)

questions),
(fourteen

State

v.

rehabilitative

questions), and State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989) (twenty
rehabilitative

questions)

reveals

the

superficiality

inconclusive nature of the rehabilitation efforts here.

and

The trial

court's only rehabilitative question failed to dispel the inference
of bias and partiality raised by Mr. Scholle's employment with law
enforcement agencies for twenty years.
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The Utah Supreme Court has explored the purpose of voir
dire in depth in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988) :
All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be
appropriate is that it allow "defense counsel to exercise
his peremptory challenges more intelligently." [State v.
Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)].
Peremptory
challenges are designed to allow an attorney to remove a
juror, not because he or she is prejudiced as to the
particular facts of the case, but for "more general biases
that affect how a juror may perceive and evaluate
witnesses, parties, and evidence.
Juror attitudes
revealed during voir dire may indicate dimly perceived,
yet deeply rooted, psychological biases or prejudices
that may not rise to the level of a for-cause challenge
but nevertheless support a peremptory challenge. Thus,
trial counsel should be given considerable latitude in
asking voir dire questions, especially in view of the
fact that only counsel will, at the beginning, have a
clear overview of the entire case and the type of
evidence likely to be adduced. Voir dire should not be
restricted to a "stark little exercise" which discloses
little.
rPeoole v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal.
1981)] .
Accord State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-8 (Utah 1991).
In this case, voir dire was inadequate to properly assess
challenges for cause, much less allow counsel to explore "dimly
perceived, yet deeply rooted, psychological biases or prejudices."
Mr. Scholle's employment in law enforcement for twenty years raised
at least an inference of bias and partiality, which the trial court
failed to dispel.
Forcing the defense to use a peremptory strike to remove
a juror who should have been stricken for cause is prejudicial.
E.g. , Gotschall, 782 P.2d
Woolley, 810 P. 2d at 443.

at 461;

Julian, 771 P.2d

at 1064;

For cases reversing specifically for

failure to strike a law enforcement agency employee for cause, see
e.g.

State v. West, 200 S.E.2d 859, 864-6 (W.Va. 1973) ("[W]hen
13

the defendant can demonstrate even a tenuous relationship between
a prospective juror and any prosecutorial or enforcement arm of
State

government,

defendant's

sustained by the court.");
(Ga. 1980)

(when police

challenge

for

should

be

Hutcheson v. State, 268 S.E.2d 643, 644
officers

are

challenged

criminal case, the challenge must be granted);
475 So. 2d 61

cause

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1985)

for

cause

in

State v. Mitchell,

(failure to excuse reserve

police officer was reversible error).
Mr. Ramos is entitled to a fair, impartial jury by the
sixth amendment and Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
As a result

of Mr. Scholle's potential bias,

and the

court's

failure to explore further or remove him for cause, Mr. Ramos's
constitutional rights have been violated.

Mr. Ramos is entitled to

a new trial.

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE MUG SHOT OF MR. RAMOS INTO EVIDENCE.
"Evidence
admissible
therewith."

to prove

of

other

the

crimes, wrongs,

character

of

or

a person

acts
in

is

not

conformity

Rule 404(b).

Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible at
trial provided it has "a special relevance to a
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other
than
to
show
the
defendant's
predisposition
to
criminality."
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426
(Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295
(Utah 1988) ) .
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990).
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).
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See also State v.

In this case, the mug shot of Mr. Ramos was purportedly
introduced to bolster the identification of Mr. Ramos by Detective
Lucas.

R. 442-6.

However, Detective Lucas positively identified

Mr. Ramos, and his mug shot was thus unnecessary.

Mr. Ramos's mug

shot was not probative of any other element of the crime with which
he was charged.

"The only possible effect of such testimony could

have would be to leave an impression with the jury of defendant's
bad

character.

prejudicial."

The admission

of the testimony was

State v. Pacheco, 712 P. 2d 192, 195

therefore
(Utah 1985)

(involving prejudicial statements concerning a prior robbery), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986).
Even if the mug shot had probative value, it was still
subject to the balancing test of Rule 403.

Cox, 787 P.2d at 5.

The

Mr.

probative

value

of

the

mug

shot

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

of

Ramos, was

far

Admission of evidence of

prior crimes "is presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the
admission of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition,
the evidence is excluded."

Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741.

Only one Utah case directly addresses2 the admissibility
of mug shots to show identification.

In State v. Albretson, 782

P. 2d 515 (Utah 1989), defendant was charged with assaulting a woman
with a club in her own home after she returned home from work.
2

The

See also State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 (Utah 1964) (where no
objection was made in trial court, admission of mug shots on the
issue of identification was not error); State v. McCardell, 652
P.2d 942, 945-7 (Utah 1982) ("While McCardell's arguments on this
point clearly have merit, we must be satisfied . . . that he has
complied with . . . the 'contemporaneous objection rule.'"; since
there was no objection, the issue was not addressed on the merits) .
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victim identified her assailant from a binder containing 30 to 50
mug shots.

In holding the mug shots admissible, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
Even though we recognize that under rule 403, they could
still be excluded, the mug shots here were crucial in
establishing the identity of defendant, which was the
main issue.
They were the initial source of [the
victim] 's identification, and they explained her reaction
when she identified him as her-attacker. Also, admitting
the mug shots served to rebut defendant's theory that
later identifications by her were connected to the mug
shots rather than to the attacker.
Albretson, 782 P.2d at 517.
The Supreme Court quoted People v. Travier, 197 N.W.2d
890 (Mich. App. 1972):
[I]t would be better if the jury was not allowed to see
mug shots of the defendant.
However, where, as here,
defense counsel has made an issue of the witness's
ability to recognize the defendant from the picture he
was shown by the police, it was not improper for the
trial court to admit the photos.
Id. at 892.
Here,

the

initial

source

of

Detective

identification was a prescription pill bottle.
telephone

of

the

residence

"came

back

to

a

Lucas's

A check on the
Rolondo

Ramos."

Detective Lucas verified that Mr. Ramos occasionally went by the
name of Rolondo.

R. 442.

Defense counsel never challenged the

identification Detective Lucas made of Mr. Ramos, from Mr. Ramos's
mug shot or otherwise.

Instead, the defense argued alibi.

See R.

362-4 (opening statement) , 575 (closing) , and 582-3 (closing) . The
issue

here

is

not

whether

Detective

Lucas

actually

became

acquainted with Mr. Ramos; rather, the issue is whether the person
who accompanied Detective Lucas on this particular drug buy was Mr.
16

Ramos, when both Mr. Ramos and his wife
that he was in his fiancee's apartment.

(then fiance) testified

By its facts, Albretson is

not determinative here.

A.

THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THE PREREQUISITES OF THE TEST IN HARRINGTON.

A three pronged test for considering whether to introduce
mug shots was enunciated in United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d
487 (2nd Cir. 1973) :
We perceive three prerequisites to a ruling that the
introduction of
"mug shot" type photographs does not
result in reversible error:
1.
The Government must have a demonstrable need
to introduce the photographs; and
2.
The photographs themselves, if shown to the
jury, must not imply that the accused has a
prior criminal record; and
3.
The manner of introduction at trial must be
such that
it does not draw particular
attention to the source or implications of the
photographs.
Id. at 494.
A number of courts have adopted the three pronged test of
Harrington.

See United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st

Cir. 1978);

Ingram v. State, 755 P.2d 120, 122 (Okla. Crim. App.

1988);

State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258, 263 (Haw. App. 1980);

Redd

v. Commonwealth, 591 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. App. 1979) (as approved by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Brown v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 128,
130

(Ky. 1989));

State v. Denson, 237 S.E.2d 761 (S.C. 1977); 3

United States v. Bowers, 567 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir.), cert, denied.

3

See also State v. Robinson, 262 S.E.2d 729 (S.C. 1980) ; State
v. Tate, 341 S.E.2d 380 (S.C. 1986).
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435 U.S. 976, 98 S. Ct. 1627, 56 L.Ed.2d 71 (1978);

Holsclaw v.

State, 364 So.2d 378 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert, denied, 364 So.2d 382
(Ala. 1978);

and Sloane v. State, 437 So.2d 16, 18 (Miss. 1983).

Utah should likewise adopt the Harrington test.

1.

The State Had No Demonstrable Need
to Introduce the Mug Shot of Mr.
Ramos.

The State fails to meet the first prerequisite of the
Harrington

test:

that

the

introduce the mug shots.

state

has

a

demonstrable

need

to

Introduction was thus reversible error,

and Mr. Ramos should be granted a new trial.
The State introduced the mug shot of Mr. Ramos to bolster
the

identification

made

by

Detective

Lucas.

In

trial,

the

detective was clear and unequivocal about the identification he
made.

R. 441-4.

Thus, his identification needed no additional

corroboration:
The existence of some need to prove identification
does not open the door to the manner of proof used here.
Barnes itself involved a probative purpose; the defense
had attacked the witness's identification capacity. But
"mug shots" were rejected because of an adequate
alternative means of proof. In appellant Jones' case,
the testimony of the witness and the officer as to the
conduct of the photographic array, coupled with the
resulting positive identification, made evidentiary use
of the photos themselves superfluous.
Williams v. United States, 382 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
In Tate, the South Carolina Supreme Court found:
The victim positively identified appellant in court, and
there was testimony by Detective Parris that she had
picked appellant out of a photographic lineup.
Given
this competent evidence proving identity, we fail to see
the demonstrable need to introduce the "mug shot."
18

Tate, 341 S.E.2d at 381.

The case was reversed on this basis.

In Kutzen, the court observed that "the admission of the
photographs into evidence after [the witness] made an unequivocal
in-court identification of the defendants was unnecessary."
case was reversed on this basis.

See also

The

State v. Kelly, 526

P.2d 720, 729 (Ariz. 1974) ("In the instant case, the picture was
introduced

by

the

prosecution

positively identified.

after

the

defendant

had

been

The introduction of the enlarged 'mug shot'

served no useful purpose in further identifying the defendant.
. . . Such over-reaching by the prosecution

is the stuff that

reversals are made of and was clearly error."), cert, denied, 420
U.S. 935, 95 S.Ct. 1143, 43 L.Ed.2d 411
So.2d at 381

(1975);

Holsclaw, 364

(two reliable in-court identifications negated any

finding of demonstrable need; held reversible error);

Sloane, 437

So. 2d at 18 (no demonstrable need where one witness made a positive
in-court identification; held reversible error);
235 N.E.2d 471, 475

(Ind. 1968)

("It

Blue v. State,

should also be noted that

where the witness positively identifies the defendant in the Court
room as the felon; "mug shots" introduced as evidence going to
identification are irrelevant, and of no probative value . . . .";
pre-Harrington case, held reversible error).
In

Ingram,

defendant's

appearance

between the time of the crime and trial.

changed

radically

A very full beard was

shaved, long hair was cut, and defendant had gained 60-80 pounds.
The court found that photographic evidence to show defendant's
appearance at the time of the crime was crucial to the State's
19

case, but held that a driver's license photo was more than adequate
to serve that function.

There was thus no demonstrable need to

introduce the mug shot.
This case is easily distinguishable from Albretson, where
this court held admission of a mug shot permissible.

In that case,

defendant made an issue of the victim's ability to recognize the
perpetrator from a mug shot photo lineup.

The victim's original

statements concerning identification were equivocal. Here, the mug
shot of Mr. Ramos was not demonstrably needed.
not

assert

that

Defense counsel did

the photograph viewed by Detective

Lucas was

unrepresentative of Mr. Ramos, or that Detective Lucas erred in his
identification.

No issue was made of the detective's ability to

recognize Mr. Ramos from the picture.
197 N.W.2d at 892.

Cf.

Albretson;

Travier,

Detective Lucas himself testified that Mr.

Ramos's appearance had not changed, except that Mr. Ramos had more
gray hair at the time of the offense.

R. 401.

Detective Lucas

positively identified Mr. Ramos in court, and that identification
was not challenged by the defense.
The

State

has

failed

to meet

prerequisite of the Harrington test.

the

demonstrable

need

Mr. Ramos is entitled to a

new trial.

2.

The Mug Shot Itself Implied that
Ramos has a Prior Criminal Record.

Mr.

Excision of the booking information from the mug shot did
not in any way disguise the mug shot, or reduce its prejudicial
effect.

To the contrary, the removed portion of the photograph
20

likely

aroused

the

jury's

curiosity,

and

caused

speculate as to what may have been removed.

the

jury

to

The State fails to

satisfy the second prerequisite of the Harrington test, and Mr.
Ramos is thus entitled to a new trial.
Courts

have

emphasized

the

universally

recognized

characteristics of the mug shot and the accompanying inference of
criminal activity.

In Barnes v. United States, 365 F.2d 509, 510-

11 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court commented:
The double-shot picture, with front and profile shots
alongside each other, is so familiar, from "wanted"
posters in the post office, motion pictures and
television, that the inference that the person involved
has a criminal record, or has at least been in trouble
with the police, is natural, perhaps automatic.
In Barnes, the mug shot had tape placed over the legends before
admission into evidence.

The court further commented:

The rudimentary tape cover placed over the prison numbers
on the photograph, and over the notations on the reverse
side, neither disguised the nature of the picture nor
avoided the prejudice. If anything, by emphasizing that
something was being hidden, the steps taken here to
disguise the nature of the picture may well have
heightened the importance of the picture and the
prejudice in the minds of the jury.
Id.
New York has also recognized the inherent difficulties of
remedial

efforts.

In People v.

Carroll,

61 A.D.2d

760, 402

N.Y.S.2d 8, 8-9 (N.Y.App.Div. 1978), the court noted that " [w]hile
the prison numerals across defendant's chest were taped over in the
photographs, this could have had the effect of emphasizing their
nature rather than ameliorating the problem.".
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In People v. Clark, 297N.E.2d395 (111. App. 1973), the
court reasoned that:
[A]n examination of the mug shots after the deletion
could only lead the jury to speculate as to what
information the deleted portion of the photograph had
contained. The prejudicial effect of such evidence is of
such magnitude as to overcome any relevancy or probative
value that it may have had.
Id. at 397.4
See also
of

identifying

Brown, 763 S.W.2d at 130 ("Despite the removal

numbers,

it

was

obvious

introduced into evidence were mug shots.");

that

the

photographs

Ingram, 755 P.2d at

122 ("no reasonable juror could fail to know from viewing this mug
shot in the form submitted that appellant had previously been in
trouble

with

the

law");

Blue,

235

N.E.2d

at

474

("These

photographs are highly prejudicial upon sight and may very easily
create an unfavorable automatic reaction in a juror's mind without
further investigation by him.");

State v. Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333,

336 (Ariz. 1969) ("It is this Court's opinion that the double-shot
picture

with

front

and

profile

alongside

each

other,

unless

disguised so as not to appear to be a 'mug shot', and absent an
explanation that the picture was taken at defendant's arrest on the
charge involved, intimates to the jury that defendant had a prior
criminal record.").
At minimum, the side view shot should have been removed
in addition to removing or covering the booking information, as
4

In Clark, the issue was not adequately preserved, but the
court nevertheless reversed on the basis of plain error. With a
proper objection before the court, as here, there is no excuse for
failing to exclude the mug shot.
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occurred in Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1303-4 (Wyo. 1988),
and People v. Pickett, 571 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Colo. 1977).

The Utah

Supreme Court requires no less:
When suggestive material is masked, the curiosity of the
jury is increased. Trial courts should employ safeguards
to disguise the origin of police photographs/ including
the removal of police identification numbers, United
States v. Watts, 532 F.2d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert,
denied, 429 U.S. 847, 97 S. Ct. 131, 50 L.Ed.2d 119
(1976), and separating the combined profile and frontal
views characteristic of mug shots. Id.
Albretson, 782 P.2d at 517-8 (emphasis added).

Although requested

to separate the profile and frontal views by defense counsel, R.
488,5 the trial court refused to separate the two views.

R. 490.

The photograph here was obviously a mug shot, implying
prior offenses, and should have been excluded.

The cropped version

published to the jury only accentuated the fact that this was a mug
shot and information concerning prior crimes was being hidden from
the jury.

The State has failed to meet the second prerequisite of

the Harrington test, and Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial.

3.

The Manner of Introduction Attracted
Additional Attention to the Mug Shot, and
its Probable Source.

The third prerequisite of the Harrington test requires
that

the method

of

introduction

at trial not

draw

particular

attention to the source or implications of the photograph.

5

The

"If we could somehow fix the photograph so that the side view
was taken away and chopped off the bottom of the frontal view so
that it is not clear what it is from, it would look rather odd but
I don't think that the same prejudice would be inherent in it."
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State also fails to satisfy this prong of the test.

Mr. Ramos is

entitled to a new trial.
The mug shot here was clearly not taken incident to this
offense.

Detective Lucas unambiguously testified that he reviewed

the photograph shortly after the transaction, many months prior to
Mr. Ramos's arrest.
inescapable,

The inference of prior criminal activity was

violating

Rules

403

and

404(b),

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence.
In Blue, 235 N.E.2d at 475, the Indiana Supreme Court
noted:
It is hardly an unreasonable assumption to make, that the
jurors would know that these photos were taken incidental
to an arrest or prison term and would not make the minute
distinction as to when they were taken.
They could
readily assume that the subject depicted had a criminal
record. These photographs are highly prejudicial upon
sight and may very easily create an unfavorable automatic
reaction in a juror's mind without further investigation
by him.
See also

Ingram, 755 P. 2d at 122

(" [T] he jurors knew that the

witnesses picked this mug shot from the photographic lineup three
months before appellant's arrest.

Consequently, the jurors knew

this photograph was taken in connection with another, previous,
crime.").
This is not a case such as People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d
760, 769 (Colo. 1981), where the jury would naturally assume that
the mug shot was generated in conjunction with the case being
tried.

Here, Detective Lucas testified that he reviewed the mug

shot prior to Mr Ramos's arrest for this offense.
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By cutting away fully a quarter of the picture after the
whole photograph was shown to a testifying witness, the prejudice
to Mr. Ramos was exacerbated.

The photograph was whole when

reviewed by Detective Lucas in the presence of the jury.

Removing

a substantial portion of the photograph likely aroused the jury's
curiosity,

causing

the

jury

to

speculate

as

to

the

removed

information and the nature of Mr. Ramos's prior dealings with the
police.
Finally,

Detective

Lucas

himself

indicated

the

prejudicial nature of the photograph:
Q
And what photograph was that?
A
I am afraid that if I mention that it may
prejudice the jury.
R. 439-40.

Surely this aroused the jury's curiosity.

After this

statement by the investigating detective, the trial court's abuse
of discretion in admitting the mug shot is only more egregious.
The

manner

of

introduction

heightened

the

jury's

awareness of the prejudicial nature of the mug shot. The State has
failed to satisfy the third prerequisite of the Harrington test,
and Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial.

B.

ADMISSION OF MR.
PREJUDICIAL.

RAMOS' MUG

SHOT

WAS

Under the facts of this case, admission of Mr. Ramos's
mug shot into evidence could not have been harmless error.
case

involved

a

credibility

battle

between

Detective

This
Lucas,

testifying that Mr. Ramos was present when the drug transaction
occurred,

and Mr. Ramos and his wife Maria Reyes Ramos, both
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testifying that he was in her apartment the entire day when the
alleged transaction occurred.

The prejudicial inference that Mr.

Ramos had prior dealings with the police could well have been what
tipped the scales towards conviction.
The jury in this case was probably influenced by the mug
shot of Mr. Ramos and the necessary implication that he had prior
involvement with the police.

Absent such evidence, the jury might

have rendered a more favorable verdict.
shot was not harmless error.

Introduction of the mug

As set forth above, numerous courts

in similar cases have held admission of mug shots to be prejudicial
error.

E.g., Barnes, Blue, Carroll, Clark, Fosher, Harrington,

Holsclaw, Ingram, Kutzen, Sloane, Tate, and Williams.

This case

must also be reversed.

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE LENGTHS
DETECTIVE LUCAS WAS WILLING TO GO TO WAS
IRRELEVANT AS IT BORE ON HIS CREDIBILITY,
MOTIVE, AND BIAS.
Defense counsel sought to probe the lengths to which
Detective Lucas was willing to go to obtain convictions, but this
line of inquiry was foreclosed by the trial court:
Q
[By Ms. Remal] Another possible way [to make it
worth an informant's while] would be if those individuals
were already charged with something, the charges might be
dismissed or decreased in severity?
MS. MC CLOSKEY:
Your Honor, I am going to
object to this.
THE COURT:
The objection is sustained.
MS. REMAL:
Your Honor, may we approach the
bench?
THE COURT:
You may.
(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.)
26

THE COURT:
You may go forward, Ms. Remal,
and the objection is sustained.
R. 415:4-16.

After the jury was dismissed for the first day of

trial, the objection, argument, and ruling were placed on the
record:
MS. REMAL:
If you recall, I was cross
examining Det. Lucas and started tcr ask him questions
about his occasional use of confidential informants and
what, if any, benefit those confidential informants
received in exchange for working with him and giving him
information. And I believe the question I had asked or
was into asking had to do with whether or not sometimes
charges are dismissed, or the seriousness decreased in
exchange for information they gave, and I believe it was
at that point that Ms. Mc Closkey objected.
What I
indicated to you at the bench and what I indicate now, is
that my reason for pursuing that line of questioning was
to show whether or not there was any potential bias or
motive of Det. Lucas and this is what I meant by that.
It appears to me that it is an argument that is
appropriate for me to make, especially in a case such as
this where the credibility of Det. Lucas is crucial to
the case at all. That the fact that he has at times gone
to great lengths in order to pursue his goal of fighting
drug use and fighting drug trafficking is very important.
MS. MC CLOSKEY:
Your Honor, my objection
was based on relevance. . . .
THE COURT:
The record may reflect, as well,
the Court did deny Ms. Remal an opportunity to pursue
that line of questioning and the Court determined that
that line of questioning was too far removed from the
facts of this particular case for it to be relevant, and
that was the basis of the Court's ruling.
R. 491-3.

A.
The

EVIDENCE OF BIAS AND MOTIVE
RELEVANT.

trial

court's

ruling

irrelevant is incorrect:
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that

this

IS ALWAYS
evidence

was

Evidence of bias or motive is not introduced for the
purposes of attacking or supporting a witness' general
credibility, though it may have that effect.
Rather,
evidence of bias or motive is "' alv/ays relevant as
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony.'"
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94
S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (quoting 3A J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987) . Accord, State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 1989).
Although Hackford deals specifically with an objection
sustained

incorrectly

objection

pressed

by

on

Rule

608(b)

the

State

here

grounds,

the

is similarly

Evidence of bias or motive is always relevant.

relevance

unavailing.

"The limitations on

the right to cross-examine regarding bias can be best summarized by
saying that the right is limited by Utah Rule of Evidence 403."
Hackford, 737 P.2d at 203.
Here,

the

balancing test.

trial

judge

never made

it

to

a rule

4 03

Under the facts of this case, the result of such

a balancing would have to be in favor of admission of the evidence.
The

evidence

was

not

prejudicial

to

the

misleading, cumulative, nor a waste of time.

State,

confusing,

The trial court's

determination that the proposed line of inquiry involved irrelevant
matters was incorrect. Matters going to bias and motive are always
relevant.

The cross-examination on motive and bias should not have

been curtailed.
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B.

LIMITING CROSS EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE
LUCAS ON BIAS AND MOTIVE VIOLATED MR.
RAMOS' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
12.

The sixth amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront
witnesses against him.6
"There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the Supreme
Court] and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expressions of belief that the right to
confrontation is an essential and fundamental requirement
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).
The
right to test the believability of a witness on crossexamination includes the right to show a witness'
possible bias or interest. The exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of
cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496,
79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959).
State v. Leonard,

707 P.2d

650, 656

(Utah 1985)

(brackets in

original) . See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-9,
106 S.Ct. 1431,

, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986).

The Utah Supreme Court "has been careful to allow wide
latitude for examination in the areas of bias and motive."

State

v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Maestas,
564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1977)).
[T] he scope of cross-examination as to credibility is and
must be broad if it is to fulfill its designated purpose
of exposing bias and purging testimony of intended or
unintended error. Full exposure of a witness' bias or
prejudice is essential if a jury is to be able to fully
assess the existence and extent of the witness' bias.
Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir.
6

See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1992), providing that all
witnesses may be examined as to their motives.
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1984); United States v. Bleckner, 601 F„2d 382, 385 (9th
Cir. 1979).
Leonard, 707 P. 2d at 656.
See e.g..

State v.

This rule has long standing in Utah.

Cerar, 207 P.

597, 602

(Utah 1922)

("The

interest of a witness in any particular case in which he becomes a
witness may always be shown . . . ") .

In this case, Mr. Ramos'

right

by

to

confrontation

was

infringed

the

trial

court's

limitation of cross-examination.

C.

THE
LIMITATION
IMPOSED
ON
DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S CROSS-EXAMINATION FOR MOTIVE
AND BIAS WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.

The constitutional harmless error standard applies to
wrongful

limitation

of

cross-examination

State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d

438, 439

for motive
(Utah 1982);

and

bias.

State v.

Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); but see Hackford, 737
P. 2d at 204
analyzed).

(dictum indicating that issue has yet to be fully

Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824,

17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) , the burden is on the State to show that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This case boils down to a credibility battle between
Detective Lucas on the one hand, and Mr. Ramos and his wife on the
other.

Denying the defense a full opportunity to explore Detective

Lucas' motivations and biases directly impacts the outcome of this
credibility battle.

The State cannot show that this error is

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new
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trial, at which the motivations and biases of Detective Lucas may
be fully explored.
Even under the normal harmless error standard, in a case
such

as

this

involving

a

credibility

battle

and

no

other

corroborative evidence, there is always a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result had full cross-examination been allowed.
Cases have been reversed specifically due to limitation of crossexamination of a police officer.

See e.g.

State v. Hubbard, 688

P.2d 1311, 1320-1 (Or. 1984) (cited in State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d
498, 500 (Utah 1986)).

Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial at

which he may fully cross-examine Detective Lucas as to his bias and
motive in testifying.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's errors in (1) failing to adequately
probe juror Scholle's bias or strike him for cause, (2) admitting
Mr.

Ramos'

mug

shot

into

evidence,

and

(3)

limiting

cross-

examination of the investigating detective, either individually or
cumulatively require that Mr. Ramos' conviction be reversed and
that he be given a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £3*JL day of November, 1993.
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ROBERT K/ HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Mug shot of Mr. Ramos (State's Exhibit 3)

